Falsificators of History - Part 3

Peace and a Unified Germany

On 8 May 1945 Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel signed the official unconditional surrender of all German forces in Berlin, bringing to an end to the war in Europe. US and Soviet troops met on the Elbe River to much handshaking and celebration and Germany was carved into four occupation zones, as agreed at the Yalta Conference in 1944. https://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=2294

Denazification and the pursuit of Nazi war criminals was a priority. War reparations were to be exacted on the Germans in the form of forced labor and confiscation of assets and technology. Each occupying power instituted its own regime in its occupation zone. The Soviets set up a socialist government in East Germany, while the Western Allies eventually merged their three occupation zones into a single ‘Trizone’ regime. As relations between the Allies degenerated, so did the relations between the German regimes.

A New Poland

At Yalta, the Soviets had pressured the Western Allies to agree that the eastern border of Poland was the Curzon Line, which had been the Soviet’s long-term position since 1920. Poland’s western border was not agreed at that time but in principle Poland would be compensated with territories from German Silesia and Pomerania, as per the Versailles settlement. To avoid a recurrence of German revanchism, Polish authorities expelled some 11 million ethnic Germans from Poland’s revised borders.

Falstificators of History - Part 2

The Soviets Propose a Unified Germany

Seven years after the end of the war in Europe the occupation regimes of Germany had taken on an air of permanence. Despite earlier joint commitments to a unified, demilitarized Germany, as the Cold War intensified, the Western Allies began to see Germany as a front-line, forward-base for a future war against the Soviet Union. The Western Allies encouraged the formation of a new West Germany, with its own constitution in 1948. In response, the German Democratic Republic was declared in 1949. Both Germany’s declared themselves to be the true representatives of a unified German state. In 1952, West Germany was invited to join the European Defense Community, the predecessor of NATO. This move was against all prior arrangements between the former allies, so in March 1952, the Soviet Foreign Ministry sent a note to the West German government and each of the Occupying Powers proposing a conference to negotiate a formal peace treaty with Germany and ending the occupation.

Note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the American Embassy, Enclosing a Draft for a German Peace Treaty, 10 March 1952

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to direct the attention of the Government of the United States of America to the fact that although about seven years have passed since the end of the war in Europe a peace treaty with Germany is not yet concluded.

With the aim of eliminating such an abnormal situation the Soviet Government, supporting the communication of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the Four Powers requesting that conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany be expedited, on its part addresses itself to the Government of the United States and also to the Governments of Great Britain and France with the proposal to urgently discuss the question of a peace treaty with Germany with a view to preparing in the nearest future an agreed draft peace treaty and present it for examination by an appropriate international conference with the participation of all interested governments.

It is understood that such a peace treaty must be worked out with the direct participation of Germany in the form of an all-German Government. From this it follows that the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., England, and France who are fulfilling control functions in Germany must also consider the question of conditions favoring the earliest formation of an all-German Government expressing the will of the German people.

With the aim of facilitating the preparation of a draft peace treaty the Soviet Government on its part proposes for the consideration of the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France the attached draft as a basis of a peace treaty with Germany.

In proposing consideration of this draft the Soviet Government at the same time expressed its readiness also to consider other possible proposals on this question.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. expects to receive the reply of the Government of the U.S.A. to the mentioned proposal at the earliest possible time.

Similar notes have also been sent by the Soviet Government to the Governments of Great Britain and France.

Draft of Soviet Government Peace Treaty with Germany

Almost seven years have passed since the end of the war with Germany but Germany still does not have a peace treaty, finds itself divided, continues to remain in an unequal situation as regards other governments. It is necessary to end such an abnormal situation. This responds to the aspirations of all peace loving peoples. It is impossible to assure a just status to the legal national interests of the German people without the earliest conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

Conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany has an important significance for the strengthening of peace in Europe. A peace treaty with Germany will permit final decision of questions which have arisen as a consequence of the Second World War. The European states which have suffered from German aggression, particularly the neighbors of Germany, have a vital interest in the solution of these questions. Conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany will aid improvement of the international situation as a whole and at the same time aid the establishment of a lasting peace.

The necessity of hastening the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany is required by the fact that the danger of re-establishment of German militarism which has twice unleashed world wars has not been eliminated in as much as appropriate provisions of the Potsdam conference still remain unfilled. A peace treaty with Germany must guarantee elimination of the possibility of a rebirth of German militarism and German aggression.

Conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany will establish for the German people permanent conditions of peace, will aid the development of Germany as a unified democratic and peace-loving government in accordance with the Potsdam provisions and will assure to the German people the possibility of peaceful cooperation with other peoples.

As a result of this, the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain and France have decided urgently to set about working out a peace treaty with Germany.

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, Great Britain and France consider that preparations of the peace treaty should be accomplished with the participation of Germany in the form of an all-German Government and that the peace treaty with Germany should be formed on the following basis:

Basis of Peace Treaty with Germany

Participants

Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States of America, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland and other governments which participated with their armed forces in the war against Germany.

Political provisions

(1)  Germany is re-established as a unified state, thereby an end is put to the division of Germany and a unified Germany has a possibility of development as an independent democratic peace-loving state.

(2)  All armed forces of the occupying powers must be withdrawn from Germany not later than one year from the date of entry into force of the peace treaty. Simultaneously all foreign military bases on the territory of Germany must be liquidated.

(3)  Democratic rights must be guaranteed to the German people to the end that all persons under German jurisdiction without regard to race, sex, language or religion enjoy the rights of man and basic freedoms including freedom of speech, press, religious persuasion, political conviction and assembly.

(4)  Free activity of democratic parties and organizations must be guaranteed in Germany with the right of freedom to decide their own internal affairs, to conduct meetings and assembly, to enjoy freedom of press and publication.

(5)  The existence of organizations inimical to democracy and to the maintenance of peace must not be permitted on the territory of Germany.

(6)  Civil and political rights equal to all other German citizens for participation in the building of peace-loving democratic Germany must be made available to all former members of the German army, including officers and generals, all former Nazis, excluding those who are serving court sentences for commission of crimes.

(7)  Germany obligates itself not to enter into any kind of coalition or military alliance directed against any power which took part with its armed forces in the war against Germany.

Territory

The territory of Germany is defined by the borders established by the provisions of the Potsdam Conference of the Great Powers.

Economic Provisions

No kind of limitations are imposed on Germany as to development of its peaceful economy, which must contribute to the growth of the welfare of the German people.

Likewise, Germany will have no kind of limitation as regards trade with other countries, navigation and access to world markets.

Military Provisions

(1)  Germany will be permitted to have its own national armed forces (land, air, and sea) which are necessary for the defense of the country.

(2)  Germany is permitted to produce war materials and equipment, the quantity and type of which must not exceed the limitations required for the armed forces established for Germany by the peace treaty.

Germany and the United Nations Organization

The governments concluding a peace treaty with Germany will support the application of Germany for acceptance as a member of the United Nations Organization.

Source: Note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the American Embassy, Enclosing a Draft for a German Peace Treaty, March 10, 1952; reprinted in Documents on Germany, 1944-1959: Background Documents on Germany, 1944-1959, and a Chronology of Political Developments affecting Berlin, 1945-1956. Washington, DC: General Printing Office, 1959, pp. 85-87.

The proposed Soviet terms of the peace settlement with Germany were extraordinarily lenient on Germany, allowing for the complete reunification, democratic rights for all, the rehabilitation of the Germany military - including all former Nazis not serving sentences for crimes against humanity - and a return to normal relations with its neighbours and the world, for the price of neutrality.

The Reaction of the West

The Soviet note took the Western Allies by surprise and there was scrambling between the foreign offices of the Occupying Powers and the West German government. The US High Commissioner, John McCloy, sounded out West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer and reported to US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson on 12 March 1952.

West German reaction to Soviet demarche appears thus far to be gratifyingly level-headed. We get this from conversations with officials and from scanning this morning’s press. Separate telegram on press reactions is being sent.

Fortunately for us, most Germans have few illusions about Russia and Bolshevism. Most Germans who learned of Soviet proposals therefore approached them with skepticism. Editors have quickly pointed out defects in Soviet note from German point of view, particularly territorial limitations. Soviet terms were in general so overdrawn as to be implausible.

Notwithstanding this, we must recognize that issue to which Kremlin directed this propaganda blast – German unity – is one regarding which German people are sensitively responsive. That no (repeat no) dramatic response has thus far been elicited is due not to error in Soviet appeal to unity issue but to ingrained German suspicion of moves originating from the East.

Dangers inherent in Soviet move appear to us as follows:

1.  Many Germans feeling strongly on unity issue will, despite conscious skepticism, wishfully hope that Kremlin proposal might at least be given a try. Natural tendency of Germans to look back over their shoulders at unity as a first priority may be fortified and there develop an increased inclination to drag their feet as we seek them to advance toward integration with West. Because these sentiments are at once so deep-rooted and so amorphous, we cannot be sure that initial sane reaction which we now observe to Kremlin demarche will remain steady.

2.  Soviet terms for peace treaty obviously increase Federal Republic’s bargaining power in contractual negotiations while paradoxically emphasizing provisional character of Federal Republic thereby weakening government’s position.

3.  If our reaction to Soviet note appears to be negative and foreclose possibility of German unity, Kremlin proposals will come to exercise an appeal which they do not now possess and task of persuading West Germans to go along with integration will be critically impeded.

We offer following suggestions for consideration by Department in its preparation of reply to Soviet Government.

1.  We should indicate that we are gratified to note that Soviet Government has come to agree with us regarding importance of taking as a first step toward peace settlement creation of an All- German Government through democratic process. This obviously means All-German elections.

2.  We have participated in creating of a UN commission to examine simultaneously in Federal republic and Soviet Zone possibility of holding such elections and to report findings to the UN.

3.  We have forwarded to Soviet Government a Federal Republic draft law for holding such elections.

4.  We await indication from Soviet Government that it will support these moves and hope that answer will be in affirmative.

5.  Being serious in our desire to establish German unity as the indispensable first step toward peace, being interested in practical progress toward this goal and seeing no useful end being served by encouraging Soviet exercises in sophistry such as have been witnessed at the Palais Rose and through Austrian peace treaty negotiations, we do not propose to engage now in a discussion of the inadequacies of Soviet proposals for a German peace treaty.

To give reply positive tone first two points should be heavily emphasized and fifth played down.

Finally, we would recommend against officially going into any details regarding peace treaty terms proposed by Soviet Government. However, we do not feel that this should preclude active background guidance to press and radio.

We consider reply to Soviet note should be issued as soon as possible to avoid appearance to Germans of lack of allied resolutions.

Adenauer owed his elevation to the Chancellorship to his western backers and was fundamentally opposed to communism. He was therefore extremely suspicious of the Soviet offer, something his backers capitalized upon. In a subsequent telegram McCloy sent to Acheson on 29 March, highlights how deeply the anti-communist / anti-Russian propaganda was inculcated into western thinking.

“It is particularly difficult to judge German public opinion as soon after exchange of notes but we tend to believe that Germans’ experiences of Russia as occupiers, prisoners of war and occupied make them skeptical of any Soviet offer and that are therefore not (repeat not) as yet greatly impressed by it. This negative reaction is, however, not (repeat not) static and may be reversed by the politicians particularly if West Powers appear to oppose unification.

Among those politicians who have carefully studied implications of note and our reply there are basically two schools of thought. Adenauer whose entire political creed is based on Western integration considers note chiefly an effort to disrupt his policy. Some of his advisors intimately familiar with Russia hold to view that Kremlin is in dead earnest in its intention not (repeat not) only of disrupting integration but of reorienting Germany to the East with initial status perhaps more like Finland or even Sweden than Czechoslovakia but eventually as a junior partner in Soviet drive for world domination. They see a parallel between situation today and in 1939 when Westerners were futilely negotiating with Russians to prevent a German-Russia alliance which was so rudely shattered by Stalin’s dramatic offer to Hitler resulting in Molotov Ribbentrop Act. Aware of challenge of such an offer Adenauer firmly believes it is up to Germany to prove her loyalty to West by rejecting it flatly and expediting conclusion of Defence Treaty and contractuals.”

The western myth that THEY were negotiating futilely with the Soviets to prevent a German-Soviet alliance was already alive and well.

Falsificators of History - Part 1

Discussions now turned to specific items in the proposed draft peace treaty. A major sticking point for the West Germans was, once again, the loss of Germany’s eastern provinces of Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia, which had been split between Russia and Poland.

…..Oder-Neisse Line is, of course, least palatable of Soviet proposals. Initially Germans were inclined to view that no (repeat no) German Government could accept settlement which did not (repeat not) involve return of east provinces. However, some Germans are now (repeat now) veering to view that they should take what they can get today and wait for rest till a more favorable opportunity arises.

This territorial adjustment had been agreed by all the Allies before the war, restoring Poland the territories awarded it in the 1919 Versailles Treaty, but now the Western Allies encouraged West German revanchism on its eastern border.

Another angle to attack the Soviet proposal was through splitting hairs defining the ‘democratic will’ of the German people. As in Korea, and later in Vietnam, free elections were called for to assess the will of the people, and once again the Western Allies refused to proceed down this route. Instead, West Germany and its sponsors bombarded the Soviets with demands how they foresaw free elections being held and then criticizing the responses as ‘unworkable’ or ‘deceptive.’ The Soviets had not proposed a mechanism for holding these elections - it was not their role to do so - but had recommended that all interested parties come together for a conference to discuss a way forward. The Soviet proposal was not ‘full and final’ but was an invitation to begin a negotiation, based upon the principles already agreed in the Casablanca, Tehran and Potsdam agreements. The Allies only needed to agree in principle that free elections would be held and then it would be up to the German governments and the UN to agree the mechanism for those elections. Once again, the Soviets observed that the Western Allies and its German puppet were not prepared to negotiate with it in good faith.

In declining the Soviet offer, West Germany and her sponsors pointed to the Soviet settlement with Finland and Austria as if these settlements were deceptive. Finland had been militarily defeated by the Soviets in the Winter War in 1940 and forced to make a number of territorial concessions in southern Karelia. The Soviets could have forced a much harsher settlement on Finland at the time. Even after Finland joined Operation Barbarossa in 1941 and was defeated again in 1944, the Soviets did not harshly treat Finland. Finland’s government was left intact, the borders were restored to the status quo-ante and Finland’s neutrality was re-enshrined in law. Relations between these two former enemies remained cordial and peaceful for the next 75 years.

Similarly in Austria, where the Soviets made the same offer of reunification of the country - which too had been partitioned into four occupation zones in 1945. The Austrians however accepted the offer and all occupying forces withdrew from the country and duly enshrined neutrality in the Austria constitution. Austria remains one of the few European nations not incorporated into NATO, although it does have a cooperation agreement with the military alliance.

There is no reason to believe that the Soviet’s were not genuinely offering peace terms for a unified Germany in 1952 or negotiating in bad faith. The claims of bad faith came from the west and continued with the lies and false statements made about the German-Soviet pact of 1939, which had only come about due to the duplicity and bad faith of the British and French. Germany went on to become the front-line state in the West’s continuing war against the Soviets / Russians and remains today an occupied nation, with tens of thousands of foreign (US) troops on its soil and a non-sovereign, Quisling government in place.